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ScienceDirectPolitical psychologists studying ideology have been
increasingly examining its relationship with emotion. Much of
this work has focused on potential ideological differences in the
intensity of emotional experiences, leading to conflicting
findings. Some work has supported the perspective according
to which fundamental psychological differences exist between
ideological leftists and rightists, while other work has
challenged this view, demonstrating ideological symmetry in
emotion. The present review highlights recent advances that
can shed further light on this debate, adopting a multi-
dimensional, context-sensitive approach to the study of
ideological differences in emotional processes. Accordingly,
we propose that instead of asking whether or not ideological
differences in emotion exist, researchers should ask when, in
what ways, and under what circumstances they exist.
Addresses
1 Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333AK Leiden,
The Netherlands
2Hebrew University, Mount Scopus, Jerusalem 9190501, Israel
Corresponding author: Pliskin, Ruthie (r.pliskin@fsw.leidenuniv.nl)
Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:75–80
This review comes from a themed issue on Emotion, motivation,
personality and social sciences - *Political Ideologies*
Edited by John Jost, Eran Halperin and Kristin Laurin
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2020.01.005
2352-1546/ã 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Emotions, defined as ‘states that comprise feelings, physio-
logical changes, expressive behaviors and inclinations to act’
[1, p. 5], have captured the interests of scholars for centuries
[e.g. Refs. 2–4]. Because they serve as powerful engines of
behavior and decision making, the study of emotions has
rapidly evolved in recent years, with ‘affective science’
emerging as a field of research in its own right [5]. This
fascination has not escaped the research agendas of political
psychologists studyingideology,andthe lastdecadehasseen
an accumulation of research on the relationship between
ideology and emotion [e.g. Refs. 6,7,8,9]. Such interest is
only natural, as emotions drive appraisals of all new
information, shaping how we see the world and influencingwww.sciencedirect.com decision-making across domains [10–12], rendering
emotions fundamentally important for our understanding
of complex social realities and social change. This perspec-
tive, based on the Appraisal Tendency framework [12],
means that emotions can both shape ideological worldviews
and — because the motivations associated with ideologies
influence appraisals [13] — be shaped by them. Nonethe-
less, most of the research conducted thus far has asked some
form of the following general question: Are there ideological
differences in these affective processes? We argue that this
question, though interesting, may be too simplistic.
In addition to being multi-dimensional processes [1],
emotions are highly context-dependent, with different
targets and situations shaping them in important ways
[14,15]. Any attempt to boil the ideology-emotion link
down to whether or not emotional processes are
symmetrical across the ideological spectrum is thus all
but doomed to deliver a partial answer that may not be
replicable across processes and situations. Accordingly,
we argue that to fully understand the relationship
between ideology and emotions we need to a) study
multiple elements of the emotional process, complement-
ing the current focus on intensity; and b) contextualize
the examination of ideological differences in these
emotional processes. To this end, we first briefly review
the ideological symmetry versus asymmetry debate as it
relates to emotional intensity. Next, we elaborate on our
argument and review research that lends support to our
approach. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of
the promise contained in a multi-dimensional, context-
sensitive approach to the study of potential ideological
differences in emotion.
Ideological (a)symmetry in affective
processes
Much of the ongoing research on the psychology of
political ideology — defined as an ‘interrelated set of
attitudes, values, and beliefs with cognitive, affective, and
motivational properties’ [10, p. 315] — has focused on the
task of identifying differences between ideological
leftists and rightists in fundamental psychological
processes. Several prominent researchers [13,17,18]
have repeatedly and consistently demonstrated such
differences, arguing that they are a central factor behind
differential gravitation towards competing ideologies.
Challenging this ideological asymmetry approach,
other researchers have called into question either theCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:75–80
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identified, or specific findings that have been used to
support it [19,20,21].
Of particular relevance to the present review, part of this
debate has centered on affective processes, focusing on
ideological differences in the intensity with which people
experience negative affect. For example, extensive
research suggests that rightists are more reactive in their
responses to fear-inducing [17,22,23,24] and disgust-
inducing [25–28,29,30,31] stimuli, andthat these emotions
can even shift people further to the right [22,32–34]. More
recent research has challenged these prior conclusions,
proposing certain boundary conditions for ideological
differences or arguing that the processes are actually
symmetrical. For example, Choma and Hodson [35] have
found greater reactivity to fear-inducing (i.e. threatening)
stimuli to be associated with certain dimensions of rightist
ideology (i.e. right-wing authoritarianism), but not others
(i.e. social dominance orientation). Similarly, proponents of
the symmetrical approach argue that physiological data
provide no evidence for asymmetry [6], that different
fear-inducing stimuli shift attitudes to either the right or
the left [36], or that extremity rather than ideology
influences fear reactions [21]. Crawford [37] echoes all
of these critiques, proposing that both rightist ideology
(i.e. conservatism) and threat were too broadly conceptual-
ized in previous accounts, and that differences are limited
to how intensely social conservatives versus liberals react
specifically to physical threats (for similar arguments
regarding ideological differences in disgust sensitivity,
see Refs. [7,26]).
These disagreements among researchers have not been
limited to negative affect, with some of the discussion
focusing on more positive emotional processes, such
as happiness and empathy. Examining general happiness,
several researchers have found that rightists (i.e.
conservatives) report higher levels of happiness than
leftists (i.e. liberals) [38,39,40]. The reason for this
appears to be that rightist ideologies serve a palliative
function, allowing people to better manage threat [40]
and exposure to different forms of injustice [41]. Work
by Wojcik and colleagues; however, has yielded
seemingly contradictory results, suggesting that despite
greater self-reported happiness among rightists, leftists
actually experience more positive affect as judged based
on their facial expressions [42]. Nonetheless, recent find-
ings support the notion of a self-protective mechanism,
demonstrating a link between rightist economic ideology
and dampened negative emotional reactions — be they
self-reported, physiological or expressive — to instances
of economic inequality [41]. This debate, therefore, has
also yet to be definitively resolved.
Finally, scholars have also tried to determine whether
ideological differences also relate to differences inCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:75–80 empathic reactions. Initial findings suggest ideological
asymmetry in the experience of empathy, with leftists
experiencing more empathy in general [43–45] or in
specific contexts [46] and extending empathy across more
distant social categories than do rightists, whose empathic
concern is limited to members of more proximal groups
[47]. A central reason for this appears to be differences in
tendencies towards universalism — more in line with
leftists’ views on social equality — versus patriotism or
nationalism — more in line with a desire to see one’s own
group triumph within social hierarchies that are perceived
as more inevitable by rightists [44,47]. The idea that these
differences are limited to less proximal groups, however,
challenges the notion that there are actual fundamental
differences in empathy between rightists and leftists,
arguing that previously documented differences may
have stemmed from the specific empathy targets
employed [47].
These contradictory approaches and seemingly contradic-
tory findings paint the picture of an intractable conflict
between two camps — ideological symmetry versus
asymmetry. This conflict appears to become more ideologi-
cal and more polarized as the debates continue. We suggest,
however, that the dispute is, in fact, tractable, at least when it
comes to the study of ideological differences in emotional
processes. Nonetheless, the road to its resolution is not as
straightforward as the arguments of either camp — taken to
their extreme — would suggest.
Adopting a multi-dimensional, context-
sensitive approach to the ideology-emotion
link
As we have reviewed above, the lion’s share of the debate
on ideological (a)symmetry in emotions has focused on
emotional intensity. But intensity is only one element of
the emotional process, which is in its essence complex
and multi-dimensional. In fact, individuals’ emotional
reactions reflect a combination of automatic and more
deliberative, regulated processes. Furthermore, emotions
are associated with action tendencies, but the latter may
be activated to varying extents depending on multiple
factors. To understand individuals’ emotional processes,
we thus need to understand how and why they regulate
their emotions, the action tendencies associated with
their emotions, and the ways in which the features of
the context shape all of these. Accordingly, we argue that
in order to truly understand potential ideological
differences in emotional processes, we must tease these
elements apart and examine them in context. By doing
this, we can distinguish fundamental differences in fully
automatic reactions from differences stemming from
more symmetrical ideology consistent motivations and
regulatory strategies. Very little research has thus far been
undertaken towards this end, but ongoing efforts have
already yielded some promising findings.www.sciencedirect.com
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both the intensities with which people feel emotions and
how they express them is emotion regulation, meaning
the strategies people employ to alter the magnitude,
frequency, experience, and expression of their emotions
[48]. It is thus important to consider emotion regulation
when trying to understand the emotions that people
ultimately experience. Cognitive reappraisal — an
emotion regulation technique involving changing the
meaning of a stimulus — is often cited as an especially
constructive strategy, as using it effectively modulates the
emotional experience (at least for lower intensities of
emotion) while maintaining long-term benefits such as
recall and improved long-term coping [48,49]. Interest-
ingly, there is evidence that increased reappraisal leads to
reduced support for conservative policies [50] and
increased support for dovish policies relating to leftist
ideology in intergroup conflict [51–53], perhaps because
support for these policies demands the consideration of an
issue from multiple perspectives — an element of
reappraisal. More recent research has demonstrated
possible links between ideology and expressive
suppression, a strategy associated with modulation of
the expression — but not the experience — of an emotion
[48]. Specifically, both self-reported and physiological
evidence indicates that ideological rightists’ (versus
leftists’) faces are less emotionally expressive [18],
findings that match earlier work demonstrating that
rightists view emotions less favorably than leftists [54].
Such fundamental differences in expressive suppression
can also help settle the seemingly contradictory findings
that leftists express more happiness than rightists,
despite reporting less happiness [42]. Just as ideological
differences have been identified in reappraisal and
suppression, they may emerge in other emotion
regulation strategies as well. For example, previous find-
ings on greater uncertainty avoidance among rightists [16]
may indicate that rightists would be more likely to
employ situation selection to regulate their emotions,
avoiding novel situations that are rife with uncertainty.
While the above findings point to potentially fundamen-
tal ideological differences in emotion regulation, other
differences may be more context-dependent. For
example, a cognitive reappraisal-based intervention to
reduce political intolerance was more effective in reduc-
ing rightists’ than leftists’ intolerance towards members of
the adversary group in a violent conflict, but had similar
effects on both groups when the targets of intolerance
were members of each individual’s least-liked group [52].
Similarly, ideological differences have been identified in
how people choose among emotion regulation strategies,
but these differences are also dependent on the content of
the emotion-provoking stimuli [9]. Congruent with
previous findings that people prefer disengaging emotion
regulation strategies (i.e. distraction) over engaging
strategies (i.e. reappraisal) when experiencing higherwww.sciencedirect.com intensities of emotion [49], ideological differences in
the choice between engaging and disengaging emotion-
regulatory strategies emerged only for content to which
leftists responded more intensely than rightists (i.e. the
suffering of an adversary outgroup). Interestingly,
leftists were more likely than rightists to disengage from
this content due to their more intense experiences of
it [9]. In other words, the ideologically congruent
differences between hawks and doves in emotional
intensity — echoing the above-reviewed findings on
the expanse of empathy — fully explained their differing
regulatory choice patterns. Furthermore, these
differences were limited to a certain kind of emotion-
inducing content, suggesting context-dependent rather
than fundamental ideological differences.
Beyond modes of emotion regulation, the motivations
people have — be they hedonic or instrumental — are
known to impact the direction towards which they regulate
their emotions [55], thereby shaping their emotional expe-
rience. For example, Porat et al. have demonstrated that
ideology is a central predictor of the emotions people want
to feel towards theadversary group ina violentconflict,with
leftistsmoremotivated toexperience empathy andrightists
more motivated to experience anger — motivations that
partially explain observed differences in emotional experi-
ence [46]. They have also found that when faced with
existential threat, leftists are motivated to feel collective
angst — related to existential fear — because this emotion
can prompt and justify support for aggressive policies to
protect the ingroup [56]. This finding may offer insight into
the above-reviewed evidence that fear moves people to the
right. Relatedly, in the context of intergroup conflict,
leftists and rightists may both manage their fear through
reappraisal, but the new cognitive meaning they give fear-
inducing stimuli appears to be shaped by their motivations
to maintain ideology-congruent beliefs about the ingroup
and outgroup [57]. Finally, previous findings on ideological
differences in empathy appear to at-least-partially stem
from differences in the motivation for empathy: While both
rightists and leftists appear to have a lower motivation for
outgroup-targeted empathy than for ingroup-targeted
empathy in the context of ideological conflict, leftists
generally have a higher motivation for empathy than do
rightists, across targets [8]. Individuals’ motivation for
empathy is known to determine whether they try to
upregulate or downregulate their empathy [58], which
may explain how, as stated above, leftists’ stronger
adherence to universalist beliefs leads them to experience
more empathy through the motivated upregulation of
this emotion. Taken together, this body of research
demonstrates that previously-observed ideological
differences in emotional intensity, often thought of as
reflecting purely automatic reactions, can at least in part
beexplained bysimilar motivations toexperience emotions
or maintain beliefs congruent with each camp’s ideological
beliefs.Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:75–80
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another important attribute, and a central reason for
researchers’ interest in emotions [1,59]. An underlying
assumption of much of the research referenced above,
then, is that ideological differences in emotion are impor-
tant because they predict corresponding differences in
behavior. Interestingly, however, recent research has found
that emotions may not equally motivate changes in attitudes
and behavior for leftists and rightists. For example, within
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, emotions — even when
experienced at similar intensities across the ideological
spectrum — have been found to lead to corresponding
changes in policy support only or mostly among leftists,
having little or no effect on the policy preferences of
rightists [60]. Similarly, aspects of conservative ideology
in the U.S. appear to dampen or even reverse the effects of
empathy [61] andanger [62] inductions on support for social
welfare andracial equality promoting policies, respectively.
But context seems to be central here: This dampening
effect was replicated when examining the effects of fear on
fleeing tendencies further to an ideologically-relevant
stimulus (i.e. a political uprising by an outgroup), but the
effect was reversed when responding to an ideologically
irrelevant threat (i.e. an epidemic) [15]. In other words,
rightists may be less emotion-driven than leftists, but only
when their ideology provides clear guidelines on the
‘appropriate’ attitudinal response — indicating a context-
specific motivated process rather than a fundamental
psychological difference.
Finally, it is important to note that emotions in general
and ideological differences in emotions in particular
cannot be examined in a vacuum, as they are fundamen-
tally embedded in social reality and context [63,64].
Indeed, for each element above, we have already
identified contextual factors that dramatically alter
the extent and/or direction of ideological differences.
One such factor is the content of stimuli. This may refer
to the identity of a group towards which emotion is
experienced, which we and others have found to shape
the effectiveness or mode of emotion regulation [9,52],
motivations for emotions (e.g. empathy [8]), and the
intensity of intergroup negativity [19]. Likewise, it
can refer to whether or not a given stimulus directly
relates to the contents of one’s ideological beliefs, deter-
mining whether those beliefs can provide motivations
and/or guidelines for specific reactions [15]. Another
relevant contextual factor is emotional climate. Research
has shown that individuals’ emotions are often shaped by
intragroup emotional influences [65], meaning that
different emotional norms could explain ideological
differences in emotion on the individual level, and these
may be further exacerbated by documented ideological
differences in needs for a shared reality [66]. These are
only examples, but they powerfully illustrate how context
fundamentally shapes each and every process reviewed
above. Accordingly, we propose that features of the socialCurrent Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 2020, 34:75–80 context be taken into account when examining
ideological differences in emotional processes. In other
words, we argue that instead of asking whether or not
ideological asymmetry exists in emotional processes, we
should ask when, in what ways, and under what circumstances
such asymmetry exists.
Conclusion
Taken together, these advances in the study of the
ideology-emotion link support our contention that a more
nuanced, context-sensitive examination of emotion holds
the key to understanding the extent to which rightists and
leftists differ in their affective processes. More specifi-
cally, these advances point to a potential resolution of the
debate on ideological symmetry versus asymmetry:
certain processes appear to more fundamentally differ
across the ideological spectrum (e.g. the regulatory strat-
egies that people employ when experiencing emotions in
their daily lives), while others reflect motivated
differences stemming from more symmetrical motiva-
tions to experience the world in an ideology-congruent
manner. Future research can test these propositions by
further breaking down emotions into their various parts
when assessing potential ideological differences. Further-
more, studying each element across multiple contexts can
offer the best tool for distinguishing between more
fundamental differences and those that depend on the
relationship between the content of one’s beliefs and
specific stimuli or outcomes.
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